
Photo: The Times
Britain’s labour market is entering a phase of uncertainty. While headline figures remain widely watched, a growing number of economists are warning that the traditional metrics—especially the Labour Force Survey (LFS)—may be masking deeper shifts. That means eyes are turning to recruitment firms, pay-as-you-earn data, job vacancies, and inactivity trends for clearer clues.
On Friday, recruitment giant Hays is expected to release a new performance update. In recent years, its commentary has become something of a benchmark for hiring sentiment and labour demand. Market watchers will parse every nuance: how many roles it filled, where demand is softening, and whether permanent vs. temporary placements are shifting.
The LFS—from which the official unemployment rate is drawn—has come under intense scrutiny. It has been delayed, reweighted, and even suspended in parts due to low response rates since the pandemic.
In May–July 2025, the ONS placed the unemployment rate at 4.7%, with 1.67 million people recorded as unemployed. At the same time, the economic inactivity rate for people aged 16-64 stood at 21.1%, representing 9.12 million individuals.
Yet more reliable sources diverge. LFS-driven employment growth (650,000 new jobs over the past year) contrasts with PAYE (payrolled employee) data, which showed a loss of 125,000 jobs, and workforce jobs series, showing only 138,000 net gains.
Analysts argue this means parts of the labour force are drifting into inactivity rather than unemployment—i.e. people dropping out of the formal market entirely. The Resolution Foundation estimates that inactivity may have risen by about 1 percentage point over the past two years, reversing the officially reported decline.
Given this discord, several members of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee have questioned using LFS data as a basis for decisions. The central bank, after all, depends on accurate readings of employment slack and wage pressures to set rates.
One of the central puzzles is the scale of economic inactivity. Of those aged 16–64, more than 9 million are not working and not seeking work.
Health-related exits loom large. In recent years, long-term sickness has become the top reason for inactivity. The Department for Work & Pensions reports that 90% of those on long-term sickness benefits remain in that status after two years.
By some recent estimates, 5,000 working-age Britons per working day are being shifted onto long-term sickness benefits—suggesting a rising trend that could see £100 billion in annual expenditure on sickness or disability benefits by decade’s end. The scale of this is staggering and hints at a loss of productivity and human capital.
Beyond health, structural issues contribute: caring responsibilities, early retirement, mental health, and bureaucratic barriers all play roles. The phenomenon has been dubbed a “participation crisis,” with the U.K. losing out on tax revenue and labour supply. In past studies, departing workers have been estimated to cost the Exchequer £16 billion per year in lost tax receipts.
Even amid this murkiness, some clearer signals are emerging. The number of job vacancies—once a roaring indicator of demand—has been falling for 38 consecutive periods, reaching 728,000 in June–August 2025.
This drop reflects stress in hiring appetite. Certain sectors are hit harder: graduate roles, human resources, marketing, retail, hospitality, and administrative support have all recorded sharper declines. In some analyses, advertised jobs are down 17% year on year.
Paradoxically, wage growth is still holding up—annual increases in regular pay are running at 4.8%, though in real (inflation-adjusted) terms the boost is modest (0.5–1.2%) depending on the inflation measure used.
The mismatch between falling vacancies and still-elevated wages suggests a skills mismatch: many jobseekers lack the in-demand skills for open positions. To adapt, some firms are shifting hiring criteria toward skill-based hiring—especially in growth areas like AI, green tech, and data—rather than insisting on formal degrees. Studies show that for AI-related roles, the premium for demonstrable skills sometimes exceeds the wage upsides of higher education credentials.
This is where firms like Hays, PageGroup, SThree, Robert Walters, and Staffline enter the frame. Though often smaller in scale (many with £50–£200 million market capitalizations), these staffing firms have proved resilient and informative, reflecting ground-level demand and hiring trends across sectors.
Their upcoming quarterly updates will be parsed for signs of softening demand, shifts in contract types, regional differences, and sector rotation. If Hays reports a drop in permanent placements or regions where demand is collapsing, that could confirm weaker labour demand that the official numbers obscure.
As tensions rise, here are scenarios and indicators to watch:
Britain’s jobs market is in fog. Official unemployment rates, once trusted guideposts, now come with health warnings. Behind the scenes, millions are slipping out of the labour force; hiring demand is softening; and wages, though still rising, may struggle to keep up in real terms.
Recruitment firms like Hays offer a fresh lens into demand dynamics. So do PAYE data, job vacancy trends, and inactivity patterns. As the ONS retools its tools, analysts, policymakers, and investors will need to triangulate across these signals—not rely on a single headline—to understand where the U.K. labour market is headed next.









