
Photo: TS2.tech
The dramatic collapse of First Brands Group, a major U.S. auto parts manufacturer, has sent shockwaves through the private credit market, leaving some of the world’s largest lenders scrambling to contain the financial fallout. The company’s bankruptcy filing has put firms such as Jefferies and UBS O’Connor under intense scrutiny as investors assess their exposure to one of the most significant credit implosions of 2025.
The event has reignited concerns over the rapid expansion and risk appetite of the private credit sector, which has more than doubled in size over the past five years to reach an estimated $1.7 trillion globally. Analysts say First Brands’ failure could mark a turning point for the market — one that forces lenders to revisit their underwriting standards and risk models.
First Brands, known for manufacturing products such as FRAM filters and Rain-X wiper blades, had been heavily indebted for years following a series of leveraged buyouts. The company’s debt load reportedly exceeded $3.5 billion, much of it financed through direct lending arrangements outside traditional banks.
According to court filings, the company faced tightening liquidity and falling cash flow amid slowing car sales and rising input costs. By mid-2025, interest payments had become unsustainable, and negotiations with creditors failed to produce a restructuring plan. When the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, private lenders were left holding hundreds of millions in impaired loans.
The largest exposures are believed to be linked to funds managed by Jefferies, UBS O’Connor, and several private credit funds tied to Apollo Global Management and Ares Management. Some of these lenders had classified portions of their loans to First Brands as “performing” as recently as May, despite warning signs in the company’s earnings and cash flow.
The implosion has sent tremors through an industry that had positioned itself as a stable alternative to traditional banking. In the last decade, private credit funds have emerged as major players in corporate lending, stepping in where banks pulled back after the 2008 financial crisis. But the First Brands collapse shows that concentration risk and opaque valuation practices can magnify losses when borrowers fail.
One senior investment strategist at a major U.S. pension fund described the fallout as “the first real stress test for modern private credit.”
Preliminary estimates suggest that lenders could face combined losses exceeding $1 billion, depending on how recovery values are assessed in bankruptcy proceedings. The company’s senior secured loans are currently trading at around 40 cents on the dollar, a steep drop from par value just six months ago.
The situation has drawn comparisons to past financial debacles, including the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 and the Greensill Capital collapse of 2021, both of which exposed the dangers of excessive leverage and lax risk assessment.
The news of First Brands’ bankruptcy has rattled investors across the credit spectrum. Prices for leveraged loans and private debt tranches linked to mid-market companies have slipped 2–3% on average since the announcement. Meanwhile, credit spreads on private loan portfolios have widened sharply as investors demand higher returns to compensate for rising default risks.
Private lenders are now under pressure to reassess their exposure to highly leveraged borrowers and improve transparency in how they mark loan values. Analysts at Morgan Stanley warned in a recent note that “valuation discipline in private credit has not been tested in a real downturn — until now.”
The Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury Department are reportedly monitoring developments in the sector, concerned that concentrated risks among non-bank lenders could spill over into broader financial markets.
Lenders exposed to First Brands are now racing to limit their losses. Several funds have already begun discussions about debt-for-equity swaps to salvage some value from the company’s remaining assets. Meanwhile, restructuring advisers estimate that recovery rates could range between 25% and 45%, depending on the eventual sale of the company’s divisions.
For Jefferies and UBS O’Connor, the episode represents not only financial damage but also a reputational challenge. Both firms have been active players in private lending, promoting it as a stable income source for institutional investors. Their handling of First Brands’ exposure could influence how investors view private credit as a whole.
While the First Brands saga is unlikely to derail the entire private credit market, it serves as a stark reminder of the sector’s growing pains. The rapid expansion of private debt, combined with aggressive deal structures and limited regulatory oversight, has created vulnerabilities that are only now being exposed.
Industry observers believe this collapse will trigger a shift toward more conservative lending, tighter due diligence, and greater regulatory attention. “This is the wake-up call private lenders needed,” said one investment analyst. “The market has been chasing yield for too long without fully pricing in the risk.”
For now, the First Brands bankruptcy underscores an uncomfortable truth: the private credit boom may have reached its reckoning point, and how the industry adapts in the coming months could determine whether it matures — or cracks — under its own weight.









